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
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TWO LECTURES

ON

INTELLIGENCE

BY

Colonel VIVIAN

BRITISH ARMY

AND

Major WILLIAMS

U. S. ARMY

ISSUED BY SECOND SECTION, G. S.

G. H. Q. A. E. F.

—

April 15, 1918

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LECTURE

ON

INTELLIGENCE

By Colonel VIVIAN

BRITISH GENERAL STAFF

GENTLEMEN,

The object of my lecture this afternoon is to explain what Intelligence actually has done and what it has been asked to do during operations which have taken place during the last three years.

To start with, our Army General Staff is, generally speaking, divided into two branches, Operations and Intelligence. The duty of the Operations branch is to draw up plans of operations for the defeat of the enemy; but for any plan to succeed, a great deal has to be known about the enemy, and it is the duty of the Intelligence branch to give that to the Operations. The other side of No Man's Land is dealt with by the Intelligence, this side by Operations. The operations branch turn to us and say, "What is the enemy going to do?" "How is he going to attack?" "How strong is he?" "How many divisions are there?" "How many yards of the front line is this division holding?" "How many rifles per yard?" "With this system of trenches pointed out on the map, from this network of trenches, which of the trenches does he keep and which does he not hold?" "Of the communicating trenches shown on the map, which does he use?" "How many

rows of wire are there in front of the trenches?" "Up to what point does he bring his food by railway?" "Where are his railroads?" "What is the gauge of these railways?" "Are they meter or 60 centimeter gauge?" "What are his roads like?" "Which roads does he use for transportation by motor?" "What is his water supply like?" These are a few of the questions asked.

Let us pause for a few minutes and consider why Operations want to know these facts. Take an instance. The road we see in a divisional sector is across the line from our troops. A German motor lorry is seen coming along a certain road. What does that matter? They must be hard up to use their lorry. What is it worth to report this one lorry? Well, we are going to get three things from it.

First of all, Operations are always making plans for our advance and when we go forward our troops have to be supplied with food and ammunition. Hence, the Supply Department has got to draw up its plans to supply our people. If the Intelligence men tell them that a certain road is used by the Germans, then the Supplies have only to provide road material to link up our good roads to those good roads used by the Germans. If on the other hand, the Intelligence men cannot give this information, the consequence of that will be that the whole of our advance will be delayed until a road is converted into a road capable of bearing heavy transportation. That is one little bit of information we can get from the fact that a motor lorry has been seen going along a certain road.

Second : then that piece of information ought to help our artillery, for because of that one lorry being seen on a certain road in the daytime, at night there are probably many lorries travelling over that same road. Hence, the night lines of the artillery ought to be laid along that road and our machine guns ought to be trained to fire on that road at night. So this little tiny piece of information of one lorry seen going along that road should have considerable effect.

Let us take another point. You can say : "What is the use of knowing a light railway is 60 centimeter gauge?"

How are you going to use that information? Transportation is responsible for carrying our railways forward. They come to me and say "These light railways are meter gauge, then I am going to make preparations to link up our light railways with those of the Germans. But if you tell me that they are 60 centimeter gauge I do not need to worry about it. Hence, again, by being able to tell transportation that certain railways are meter gauge, then our transportation can make the estimates and draw up their plans for linking up our railways to those railways, and our advance will only be delayed for a short time.

Take the water question. During the Somme battle, the Intelligence were able to tell that the water supply back of the enemy's lines was extremely bad. The Germans themselves made soda water locally, and each German soldier carried up two bottles of soda water in his bag. Now being able to tell the Supply branch this, they were able to arrange for water columns, which were very large water tanks, placed on specially-made motor lorries which accompanied our troops when they advanced, and which supplied our troops with water. Our troops having gone forward, would have had no good water and would have been forced to drink the bad water. Hence these questions do have a very far-reaching effect on operations because our advance will be delayed, or aided according to the truth of the facts with which the Intelligence branch is able to furnish the Operations branch.

Now these questions are very easily answered. Intelligence men do not go across No Man's Land and see exactly what their system is. Intelligence must obtain their whole information from this side of No Man's Land. These are the different sources :

Statements made by refugees; statements made by prisoners; what we get from captured documents; photographs; listening posts; survey posts; and personal reconnaissance from our own lines.

First : what we get from refugees' statements. Refugees are French and Belgian civilians who have been occupying the territory now in the possession of the Germans and who have been sent to neutral countries. In 1916, the

Germans were very hard-up for food, they therefore sent 35,000 civilians into Switzerland. Switzerland could not feed all these people and sent them back to France. They were met and examined by French and English Intelligence officers; they wanted to know the economic situation in the German lines, and how hard-up the Germans were for food. Also they were carefully searched to see if there were any spies. They were questioned as to the treatment they had received; as to the troops seen in the back areas; number of guns they had seen and what defensive lines of trenches were being constructed by the Germans.

About the end of January all this information was sent up to G. H. Q., and by the end of January they sent down to the 4th army the information that from the prisoners' and refugees' statements, the Germans were constructing a large line of trenches somewhere between Cambrai and Saint-Quentin, and behind that front line they had five lines of trenches, the 5th line known as the Ypres line, and that the Germans would have constructed another line east of this line. I called for some of my observers, and when they reported, I explained that this report had come in and I wanted to verify it. The map showed that if the Germans were constructing trenches, they would choose the line of—canal. So I told them to go out and examine the country. They went out on the 14th of February and they found the line, photographed it and came back and reported it to me, and that was the first information we had of the Hindenburg line. This information we got entirely from refugees. If you get a few refugees you cannot place much reliance in their statements, but get a large number of refugees of this sort and from that you will see that there are facts which are very well worth investigating. From January to November of last year, the Germans evacuated into Switzerland alone, over 300,000 civilians.

Now a few words about survey posts. They are used to obtain the strength of the German artillery at the front. Survey posts are a series of posts covering the whol front which are connected to various group headquarters by a direct telephone line. Each survey post has about six men

in it and the duty of these men is when they see the flash of a German battery in the distance to notify headquarters. The sound ranging section works in a similar sort of way, although not by the flash of the gun but by the sound of the gun and record the same by means of microphones. Microphones on the post cover probably the whole of a corps front. Each box is connected with a box at headquarters. The observer directly he hears a gun touches a button that sets all these microphones working and they in turn carry the sound to the central box where the sound is recorded. On this record you see six black lines. The sound will hit one box before another, hence the black lines are broken and you can see the break in the lines. Not only is the sound ranging section able to give the position of the battery but the caliber of the gun. They can tell the difference between a heavy howitzer and a field piece. It also gives us the area of the shells from the gun. They can tell in this way the location of the battery, the caliber of the gun firing and the area of the shells. The airplanes take a photograph of the area and you have the corroborative evidence.

We had a very interesting experience during the retirement back of the German lines. I sent out representatives to actually compare our maps with the actual position on the ground of the batteries, and we found that we were about 88 % correct, which is pretty good.

Now let us take the question of prisoners' statements. Prisoners are taken frequently and their statements, if we get a few prisoners are treated with reserve, because naturally a good prisoner lies. The enormous amount of information we get that way is surprising. When there are a few their statements must be treated with reserve, but with over five prisoners you can compare the statements and arrive pretty nearly at the truth. Here are some of the things they tell us. They will tell us what the intentions of the enemy are; the enemy are going to raid us on a certain date or that an offensive is being planned. At the present moment where the German offensive is going to take place. They will tell use also that the 1st battalion is holding the first system of trenches; that 3 companies

hold the front and support lines, and they will point them out on the map; that they use a certain communication trench, etc.; that a certain line of trenches has so many dugouts along it, and the capacity of each. They will tell us what roads are used coming to the trenches. They will tell us the areas affected by our fire; that reliefs take place every 4th day and that the last relief took place four days ago; where their machine guns are; where the wire is weakest; where the dumps are; where they get their water from; where they get their engineering material from; where the headquarters are, and point them out on the map; in fact there is nothing they wont tell us. They will even tell the names of divisions, etc., and their statements are invaluable.

Now how is this information used? If you know that a battalion is holding a certain sector the whole of the operations of the artillery and the operations of our own people are based on these statements. The guns are trained on this to smash it to bits. If we know that the 1st battalion is holding certain lines of trenches, then before the attack all those trenches are wiped out. The artillery will wipe out dugouts, etc., with their heavy guns, and the field guns will barrage that line of trenches. Intelligence, by being able to give information of operations, will largely affect the success of our own arms. Suppose the 3rd battalion is back there in a village resting. We do not shell that village until the day of battle comes. Then we turn on the long range guns to deal with that village, and anybody who has had the experience of being bombed will know how devilish unpleasant it is. After five nights running those men instead of having had a good night's sleep had to sleep out on the open ground. After five sleepless nights they were ordered to go up for a counter-attack. The whole of their route is barraged, too, and they must go through that barrage before they are in a position to attack. Their morale is gone, and the counter-attack is a failure.

What does it mean that the battalion headquarters is in a certain part of the trench? That headquarters is not shelled until the day of the battle. One heavy gun is sufficient for a dugout, and perhaps a few field guns.

With luck that battalion commander's headquarters is knocked in. That commander gets no information at all as to what is happening in front of him; he can get no information of is defense. His runners will be killed. The consequence is that that commander will have no effect on the course of operations going on around him.

The success of our attacks depends largely upon the truth of the statements. Hence the question of obtaining prisoners is a very important one. This leads to the question of raids. If prisoners are coming in frequently along the line there is no need for raids. But if not we must have prisoners, hence we must have raids. Men sometimes say "what's the good of a raid? 20 or 30 of us are sent across No Man's Land; we win no ground back; we shall have some casualties, etc". What are we going to get? What is the good of a raid? Listen, the information we get from this one prisoner and others probably means that the lives of hundreds and hundreds of our men are going to be saved and that must be explained to the men. It is up to you to explain to them, when the time comes that raids are demanded, why they are demanded.

If this information is so important to us, is not this information of equal importance to the Germans? Of course it is. If we obtain so much information from the Germans do they not obtain the same amount of information from our people? And, of course we like to think the answer "No", but the reply is "Yes", they do. I have had a large number of captured documents pass through my hands and amongst others I have had examinations of British prisoners of war by German Intelligence officers and comparing them I can say there is not a pin to choose between the two. The French captured a divisional headquarters a short time ago and all its papers. There was a book there belonging to the German Intelligence department, which contained an examination of all prisoners, Belgian, British, and French, since the beginning of the war, and it was very sorry reading. There was nothing to choose.

A case in point. On the 15th of November, last, an army commander held a conference with his corps commander

and at that conference they planned to make an attack on the 28th of November. On the 23rd of November a German was shot on patrol and in his pocket was found a document. That document stated this : "British attack is expected on November 28th. All troops will be warned and strong patrols will be sent out in order to collect more prisoners". How did they get that? Not by listening posts or sets, it is all mud and water up there; not by agents or spies, spies are found at inland towns; but, some of our men were missing just before that. The attack was postponed but it did take place at 1.50 A. M., December 2nd. At 10 P. M. December 1st we got two more documents. One stated, "British attack expected in 24 hours", and the other document contained the statement they had reinforced their front line. We had a few men missing just before. The attack took place and it failed as our objective was not gained. It is not surprising. If our men betray their country like this, what chance have we got. Will this happen to you? Will your men give away information when they are captured? You like to think, "Of course not", but I would not if I were you. We can't sit down under this, it is too serious to pass by and forget and yet what steps can we take?

This takes me to the next story. It is the story of a good German. In the middle of 1916 the battle of the Somme started in. Suppose you are half way between—and—in a very quiet portion of the British line. No Man's Land was very broad, 300 yards, and very seldom a prisoner was taken there. It was regarded by both sides as rest area. The German 2nd Guard Reserve held the line. One day we got a prisoner on patrol. Now we knew that the 1st Guard Reserve Division forming part of the 1st Guard Reserve Corps had been fighting at Verdun. But here we, west of Cambrai, got a prisoner from this division. On the face of it, we jumped to the conclusion there had been a replacement. The prisoner when questioned, said, "Yes they had left Cambrai two days before, marching along a road up to the front line; he did not know the name of the road. They had slept in a village one night, the name of which he did not know". There

was nothing much in that. "Yes, the German wire was pretty good, but he had not paid much attention to it. No, he could not tell the names of the divisions on his right or left. Yes, they had a few dugouts, but he had not been in one. He could not point out anything on the map. He had been sent out on patrol to see what No Man's Land was like." From an Intelligence point of view, that man was a "dud". But there are other methods of finding our whether prisoners are as ignorant as they appear. By this method we discovered that this good German was a damned liar. That man had been in the line ten days, and the day he left Cambrai the whole of the corps left it. That was true because a week later we made a raid and captured prisoners of the 1st Guard Reserve Division at that point. This prisoner knew the road he had come by, he knew the name of the village, he knew the order of battle, the numbers of regiments, he knew what the wire was like, he knew how many machine guns there were, and what the dugouts were like. We got a lot of information out of this man although he never knew it. That man had been schooled by his company commander what to say in case he was taken prisoner.

We had another case a short time ago of a prisoner taken east of Passchendaele; he gave us a very good story. He said he belonged to the 200th division just arrived from Russia; that in travelling from Russia they had gone along certain lines of railway, had stopped at certain towns; had taken so many days to travel, etc., all of which we had no reason to believe was not true. But that man made one slip on one question we asked and made a false statement and we found out there was not a word of truth in the whole statement, but it was a jolly good story and that man was well schooled. It was of great importance if true, to know if that division was opposite our front.

As I say, "How far do you school your men what to say in case they are taken prisoner?" "Do you school them at all, or do you trust to luck that they won't talk?" Remember there are two sorts of men in every army. A large percentage of men are brave soldiers who would no more

give information away to betray their country than they would fly. These are not the men we fear. The men we fear are those of a weak character; those are our danger and those are the men that have to be schooled. If you can prevail upon every man in your company that if they are taken prisoner to give only their names and rank, you will have strong men. If that is not sufficient, you must school them, and now let us see exactly how we get information from prisoners.

German prisoners are taken and 15 or 20 of them are fallen into line and the Intelligence officer goes along the line and says a few words to each man. He is able to tell by the answers of this man as to whether this man will talk or whether he won't. If not, they are shipped to the base to work on the roads or help bunker our ships. The men we concentrate on are the weak charactered men, and that is done, not by the thumbscrew or the rack, but it is done by a strong-minded man who works on the minds of the men of weak character. It is similar to a good lawyer cross-examining you after you have been in the witness box for a half hour; you don't know whether you are standing on your head or not. That is how our Intelligence officers deal with the weak-minded prisoners. The French are very good at this. I have seen a French Intelligence officer examine a German officer aviator, and in a half hour that officer was crying like a child. Is it not remarkable that a German officer could be forced to tell us those things? Then how about the private soldier, what chance has he got to hold his tongue? If you can prevail upon your men to answer nothing, that is best; but if they must talk, then tell them what to say. "It was dark and they did not know the road; they slept in a village, but do not know the name; the wires were all right, but they paid no attention to them; they knew there were dugouts, but did not know how many steps, etc." The other method is the best way, refuse to talk.

A few words about captured documents. Documents do not lie, but in order to get the documents you must have your little success. You will not get the documents until the first attack has taken place and they will help you to

attain your objective. And you must remember that this is what Intelligence is up against—troops like to keep documents and send them home as souvenirs. Take this case.

The battle of the Somme had started. The main German second line had been broken. We had passed back and forward for several days from — wood until finally we concentrated masses of guns against it and we blew — wood off the face of the earth, and we held it. On the 9th of September we were going to make a final effort to take the village of — East of the wood. On the night of the 7th of September a German deserter came in. On him he had a battalion order stating that his division was going to be relieved on the nights of the 8th and 9th by the 5th Bavarian Division, a very fine fighting division from the north. That this division was going to leave at night and would arrive at 10. So all the artillery were warned and the course of fire was made to bear on those roads. We knew the routes they would take because the prisoner had told us. The leading battalion lost 250 men and the support battalions suffered very heavily, with the result that on the 9th we captured G—with comparative ease, thanks entirely to that document not being kept as a souvenir.

What does it mean for a division to go into a new front? You do not know the country; you do not know the maps, you do not know the way; there is a heavy barrage of fire and men dropping all around you. Next day or later what chance will they have to resist an attack?

A similar case happened where a German prisoner was taken and the document kept by the man who got it. During the interval till we got the document back, the relief had been carried out, and the Intelligence could do nothing whatever about it.

During the battle of the Somme, the New Zealanders captured some trenches and found a bit of crumpled paper on the ground and sent it back. It was the only army order we captured throughout the battle of the Somme. We got a large number of documents, but this was the only army order we got. It stated that this division was allotted

to a certain corps until it was going to be used, etc. Then with the Intelligence we would have known by that paper if they had figured in an attack.

Another instance of documents. Only three or four weeks ago east of Passchendaele a patrol of Germans consisting of four men, lost themselves and stumbled into one of our listening posts. They had a few letters in their bags which was undoubtedly strictly against orders. Those few documents gave us two facts. One, that the 88th Division had just arrived from Russia, and that the 33rd Division had just arrived from Russia. Think of the importance of that information now, when the whole force of Intelligence is directed towards finding out how many divisions are coming from Russia. Here we got two new divisions, and we got them from these four men.

The troops also like to keep picture post-cards. On the 14th of January the French captured a Bavarian and learned that the 11th division had been withdrawn. What had happened to it? There were two alternatives; that the division had been taken to Verdun, or that it had been withdrawn to strengthen the German reserve, in which case, all the worse for us. Which of those two was it? A man of that 11th division bought a picture post-card of the village he was in, and wrote to a friend at Ypres, telling him that they were resting back of the lines. The man was killed, the picture post card was found and carried back to us. At once we were able to tell Operations that when our attack went forward they must look our for a counter-attack on the right flank.

These are true facts about documents and I have tried to tell you how documents help to win victories. First, they help our country, and that is above all. Second, they protect the men in the front line because, by these documents, we are going to prevent casualties.

A word or two about listening sets. We use listening sets in two ways, offensively and defensively. Offensively we place them up in the front line to listen to the Germans and see whether they send any indiscreet messages over the telephone. We learn that the Germans are going to raid us or carry out a relief : that their headquarters is in

a certain place; information which is not going to take us to Berlin, but will help us to kill Huns.

Defensively, they are used to listen to our own telephone lines. Here are a few instances. "Yes, brigade headquarters", "Most of the taking-over has been already done", "The representative of the people coming in is already here", "A listening set has been installed here", "What? Short of petrol tins? I will send you up 50", "What day are you being relieved", "The 5th Lincolns are being attacked on the right". Take the message of the 50 petrol tins :

At Arras, we captured Vimy ridge. The cavalry were massed behind Arras waiting to go through if the hole was big enough.

G. H. Q., decided they would not press that attack. The battle of Messines ridge was about to take place; the 3rd battle of Ypres was looming in the distance. If the Germans had known this attack was about to start, they could take reserves away from the front of our army, and send them against the French. Here we informed the Germans that the D—Horse was there in the line. What does that mean? You are not telling the Germans that D—Horse had 50 petrol tins. You are telling the Germans that the British attack is going to take Arras, and have put the cavalry down there behind the lines. That is what this officer was telling the Germans. These other sentences may not help the Germans, but it will give them a jolly good chance if the flying corps is on the job, and if they have the range of the battery, etc. And all done by an injudicious message sent over the telephone, and none of which ought to be sent.

In conclusion : Do not hesitate to report even insignificant facts you see in the front line trenches. We want to know which roads are being used by the Germans; what portions of the German lines the Germans are working on; where their working parties are; where men have seen soldiers disappear into a certain house, for that would be headquarters. Information of this sort can be obtained by you, and ought to be reported always to the Intelligence of your regiment. Take time to be most careful and report

at once, so as not to be forgotten. We must not lose this information, but work it up and hand over to the relief when the new divisions come in.

Prisoners are important, hence we must have raids. Explain to the men what it means to us and to them, chiefly, to get this information of the exact system which the Germans use to defend the lines opposite us. It means the saving of hundreds and hundreds of our people and success to our country. When you take good prisoners do not kill them, for a dead Hun is no good to the Intelligence.

Warn your people not to talk if taken prisoner. If they do, they are traitors to their country, and worse than all, traitors to their own pals.

Documents. We must have an organization to collect documents and hand them over to the Intelligence. At least two men should accompany a raiding party to collect documents for the time they are in line. A coat, a bayonet, a helmet, etc., are important, because of the number they may have on them. We must have an organization of that sort. Certain men are told off in their battalion, and told where to go to headquarters, etc. On this sort of thing, our subsequent success largely depends.

Regarding listening-sets, do not send injudicious messages over the telephone.

UNITED STATES

INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS

AND ORGANIZATION

IN DIVISIONS AND CORPS

By Major R. H. WILLIAMS

G. S., A. C. OF S., G-2,
1ST. ARMY CORPS A. E. F.

The scope of this lecture deals with our machinery for Intelligence service, rather than with the principles upon which Intelligence service is based. It will be limited to answering such questions regarding the American Intelligence service as : "Who does it?" "Under whom and over whom is he working!" Channels of transmission; methods of reporting and registering information; reproducing, etc.

Our G-3 (Operations section) is charged with the drawing up of plans of operation for the defeat of the enemy, but for any operations plan to succeed a great deal of information must be obtained about the enemy and furnished to G-3. The obtaining of this information is the duty of G-2 (Intelligence section). Roughly speaking, Intelligence deals with the other side of our own wire.

The information needed by our higher commanders in order to determine their plans of operation may be classifie d as follows :

1. The enemy's order of battle;
2. The enemy's defensive organization;
3. The enemy's artillery;
4. The enemy's aircraft service.

Intelligence is asked : "What is the enemy going to do?" "How is he going to attack?" "How strong is he?" "How many divisions are there?" "What is the fighting value of the divisions opposite our front?" "How many yards of the front line is a division holding?" "How many rifles are there per yard?" "Which of the trenches shown on an Intelligence map are occupied by the enemy, and which are not?" "Which of the communicating trenches does he habitually use?" "How many rows of wire are there in front of the trenches?" "Up to what point does he bring his food by rail?" "Where are his railroads?" "What is the gauge of these railways?" "What are his roads like?" "Which roads does he use for transportation by motor, for bringing troops to the front, for bringing up his artillery, etc.?" "What is his source of water supply?" "Where are his dumps, machine gun emplacements, dugouts, observation posts, billets, location of his supports and reserves, his airdromes, balloon positions, etc.?"

It is the duty of Intelligence to obtain this information. There are various sources from which this information must be obtained. It is not always possible or desirable for the personnel of Intelligence to go across No Man's Land and obtain the information desired, therefore it is necessary to develop all the means possible to obtain it from our own side of No Man's Land. Among the sources of information are the following : statements made by refugees; statements made by prisoners and deserters; the examination of documents, including captured orders, maps, private letters, picture post-cards, etc.; photographs taken by our aviation; information received from radio stations and telephonic listening sets; observation posts; reconnaissances by airplanes; raids; patrols, etc.

For the collection and collation of Intelligence information the Intelligence service of our expeditionary forces is organized as follows : (1) G. H. Q.; (2) army; (3) corps; (4) division; and (5) regiments. At G. H. Q. the Intelligence section is divided into four subsections : (*a*) information; (*b*) secret service; (*c*) topography, map survey, and ranging; (*d*) censorship. Up to the present time the Intelligence section at G. H. Q. has been organized so as

to handle not only the intelligence of our own front but also that of all the other fronts, as well as that relating to interior conditions in Germany.

The organization of the Intelligence service for the army and corps is practically the same, the principal difference being that the army is charged with the whole front of the army and to a considerable distance to the rear, while the corps is charged only with the collection of information on its own front and to a depth of about 5 miles. The present organization of the Intelligence personnel of our corps is as follows :

A. A general staff officer, as chief of G-2.
An experienced army officer with the rank of major or captain as his assistant.

B. Four intelligence officers (3 having command of the German language), with duties as follows :
1. Enemy's order of battle—collection of all information regarding enemy's personnel, e. g. movements—dispositions—losses—tactics—morale.
Cross-examination of prisoners.
Examination of documents.
2. Information dealing with topography and technical features in enemy's area—location of machine guns, dugouts, emplacements, trenches, railroads, etc.
Cross-examination of prisoners.
Examination of documents.
3. Interpretation of airplane photographs—airplane activity—balloons, etc.
Cross-examination of prisoners.
Examination of documents.
4. Artillery—location of enemy's batteries,—field of fire of same—activity—artillery targets in hostile territory—localities in our lines habitually shelled by the enemy.

C. One officer, topographical section. Duties : issue of maps, mapping and general drawing reproduction—topographical surveys—artillery boards.
This officer has as assistants an enlisted personnel as follows: 1 master engineer, S. G., 1 sergeant, 4 corporals, 10 privates 1st class, and 7 privates. In this enlisted personnel

there are topographers, draftsmen, printers, a clerk, and a packer.

D. One Intelligence officer attached to the corps artillery. This officer is attached to the office of the corps artillery information officer. His duties pertain to counter-battery intelligence. He is responsible for the registration and dissemination of all artillery information on the corps front; liaison between counter-battery office and aviation corps—field survey posts—army maps—flash spotting and sound ranging sections. In other words, he is the representative of the chief of corps Intelligence at corps artillery headquarters.

E. One Intelligence officer attached to aviation. (Known as branch Intelligence.) Duties : examination of pilots and observers, and dissemination of this information—interpretation and issue of airplane photographs—liaison with counter-battery officer. Note : It is very necessary that these 2 officers have considerable tact. On account of the character of their duties they are independent to a considerable extent.

F. Corps observers :
2 lieutenants.
1 sergeant.
2 corporals.
24 privates.
Divisions often change on a front, but a corps remains for a considerable length of time. It is therefore necessary to have corps observers who are thoroughly familiar with the corps front. This personnel allows for 3 reliefs in 4 corps observation posts.

G. Contre-espionage :
1 lieutenant.
12 sergeants.
Intelligence police.

According to our Intelligence Regulations the general principle of intelligence work is that corps are responsible primarily for the collection of intelligence, while the army is responsible for collation. As a general principle this is true, but the corps is also responsible for collation, as corps Intelligence issue maps and information concerning

their own corps front to the organizations of the corps as well as to the organizations on either flank of the corps. The duties of corps Intelligence officers are covered fully by paragraph 15 of our Intelligence Regulations. As heretofore stated, corps Intelligence is responsible for the collection of intelligence. The principal methods of distribution of this information are by the daily corps Summary of Intelligence, the issue of maps, airplane photographs, and, in special cases, by written statements or by telephone.

The daily corps Summary of Intelligence is prepared and published by each corps G-2, and covers the period from 6 : 00 A. M. to 6 : 00 A. M. This summary is a confidential document, is not issued below regimental headquarters, and will not be taken into the front trenches. The latter is so important that a notice to this effect is printed daily at the head of the summary.

There are two main parts to each summary. The first contains all information from the corps front; the second information from all other sources. Part 3 contains information with reference to contre-espionage. This part is published in order to give a wide distribution to this information to assist in the apprehension of individuals noted as suspects. The information in part one is given under the following general headings :

1. General summary :
   (*a*) The enemy's activity;
   (*b*) Distribution of enemy's forces;
   (*c*) Enemy's intentions.

2. Information from the corps front :
   (*a*) This paragraph is divided into information received from each division front, and includes a general statement of hostile artillery activity, aerial activity, etc.

3. Distribution of enemy's forces :
   (*a*) Reliefs;
   (*b*) Units in rear of front;
   (*c*) Identifications.

4. *Miscellaneous.* — Such as areas in our section habitually shelled by the enemy, etc.

Part II contains the information obtained from other sources than our own front. Corps summaries are distributed only to units within the corps, down to regiments, with the following exception : 4 copies are sent to army headquarters, and 1 copy to the corps on each flank. Attention is invited to paragraphs 30, 31 and 32, Intelligence Regulations.

The organization of divisional G-2 is as follows : at division headquarters.

1 General Staff officer, with rank of major;
1 Intelligence officer, assistant (may be a reserve officer with rank of captain or lieutenant);
2 Sergeants or corporals, draftsmen;
2 Privates 1st class, assistants;
1 Clerk—stenographer and typist;
Division observers:
1 Sergeant or corporal observer;
7 Privates, observers and signalmen.

That for *brigade headquarters* is as follows : the brigade adjutant, assisted when necessary by a detailed officer from a unit of the brigade.

Infantry regiment :

1 First lieutenant, regimental Intelligence officer;
3 Sergeants, observers;
5 Privates 1st class, observers and Intelligence agents; (2 to be mounted on bicycles) — the enlisted personnel to be members of headquarters company;

Battalions :

1 Lieutenant, scout, assistant to regimental Intelligence officer;
1 Sergeant, scout;
2 Corporals, scouts;
12 Privates, scouts;
1 Sergeant, observer;
10 Privates, observers;
2 Sergeants or corporals, chief snipers.

The scout lieutenant in each battalion will be detailed from the lieutenants within the battalion by the regimental commander, on recommendation of the battalion commander, and will not be relieved from such duties except for cogent reasons. He will be in charge of the instruction and training of battalion intelligence personnel, under the supervision of the regimental Intelligence officer. He should be selected on account of his topographical knowledge, patrol and scout training. He will be employed solely on Intelligence work when his battalion is in contact with the enemy. The enlisted personnel of the battalion are not to be separated from their organization except when used for intelligence duties for the battalion. Enlisted personnel of regimental Intelligence service should be required to devote their entire time to intelligence work, and once trained should not be changed. The regimental Intelligence officer assumes charge and supervision over all guides and interpreters furnished to the regiment.

Divisional Intelligence sections are responsible for collecting and tabulating information regarding the area in their immediate front, up to a distance of 2 miles in rear of the enemy's front trenches. The divisional Intelligence functions are practically the same as those of the army corps, with the exception that the front for which they are responsible is naturally limited to that of their division. This is true for the whole system of Intelligence, from G. H. Q. to divisions; G. H. Q. issuing summaries, maps, etc., covering the whole front of the A. E. F., each army the same for the army front, each corps the same for the corps front, and each division the same for the division front. G-2 of divisions issue a daily summary of Intelligence similar to that issued by the corps, except that divisional summaries consist of Part I only, no information other than that from the front of the division issuing the summary being included (with such information regarding the areas on its immediate flanks as is of importance to it). Divisional summaries may be issued down to company commanders, but particular care must be taken that no information is included which would be of value to the enemy if a copy of the summary should fall into his hands.

The brigade Intelligence officer does not form a link in the chain of Intelligence, except as regards information pertaining to the brigade front. His main duties are to keep full records of all the information regarding the area in the immediate front of the brigade to a distance of about 1 mile in rear of the enemy's front line, so that in case of relief the incoming unit may have handed over to it full information.

The subject of observation is very important, as the amount of information received from the front will depend upon the training and diligence of the observers. It is the duty of the observers to report on all movements in the enemy's lines that can be seen by them, including troops, lorries, wagon transports, decauvilles, railroad trains, smoke, and in fact everything that is of military importance. They should be thoroughly trained in the French system of coordinates. It is often difficult to impress on our enlisted observers the necessity of reporting everything they see. It is hard for them to understand that the movement of one lorry along a road is of any importance, whereas this information is very important on account of it showing roads in the enemy's territory that can be used for such class of transportation and is therefore necessary for our engineer corps to know, in order for them to make their plans for connecting up roads in case we make an advance. Another example : the fact that a small column of smoke is seen rising from some point in the enemy's territory means little to an untrained observer, but when I tell you that within the last few days the Germans have dropped 3 shells into kitchens of our own regiments and battalions on the line, killing some of our men in each case, and that the only possible way in which they could have located these kitchens was by the smoke column rising from them, you can readily see how important a small item of Intelligence such as this may be.

The responsibility for the examination of prisoners and deserters is with the corps, and it is there that the thorough examination is given, but during an action the Intelligence officer of a division will, if necessary, examine prisoners briefly in order to obtain information as to the enemy's

order of battle and anything the division commander or a brigade commander desires to know immediately. This rule also pertains to regiments, but it should always be borne in mind that prisoners should be sent back to the corps as soon as possible after being captured. As prisoners and deserters constitute one of the most fruitful sources from which information of the enemy is obtained, they should be separated immediately after capture into classes : (1) officers; (2) non-commissioned officers; (3) privates and others; and their examination should take place as soon as possible. Prisoners should always be examined separately, and after the examination of a prisoner is finished he should not be allowed to communicate with those who have not been examined. When a number of prisoners are taken at the same time it is a waste of time to bother af first with those who will not talk. These latter should be separated and dealt with later.

The question of captured documents and equipment is a very serious one. Experience has shown that the information derived from same is second in value only to that secured by the actual examination of prisoners. Due to the fact that both officers and men of all the allied armies seem to have a craze for keeping documents, equipment, etc., of the enemy, as souvenirs, it has been found from actual experience that much valuable information has been lost by officers and men failing to turn in this class of information, and has in many cases caused defeats and considerable loss of life. Our officers and men should be made to understand thoroughly that no matter how small or how unimportant a document or piece of equipment seems to be it should be turned over to Intelligence at once.

In the First Army Corps we are inaugurating a system by which documents, equipment, etc., that have been turned in, after they have served their purpose, and if same are not needed by higher authorities, will be returned to the officer or man who forwarded them. Both the English and the French are experiencing great difficulty in the matter of having documents and equipment turned in, and it goes without saying that we will probably have more than they do. The other day I was present when 2 prisoners were

brought in. One of these men gave very important information. He claimed to belong to a pioneer company. The information he gave, if it was true, could only have been given by a man connected with the pioneers. We therefore looked for some identification which would prove he was what he claimed to be. There was nothing on him. Knowing that the pioneers as a rule have a special knot for their scabbards, we asked him where his was. He replied "I had one when I was captured, but when I was being brought from the front an American lieutenant colonel took it from me". This proved to be the case. Another case : a prisoner claimed the Germans were about to use a new gas, and that all German soldiers had been equipped during the past 2 months with new gas masks. When he arrived at corps headquarters he had no gas mask with him. We asked him where it was. He replied that an officer had taken it from him at the division. This was also true. We obtained the gas mask later, but lost 24 hours in obtaining the information we were after. I could give you many more like incidents, but believe that these are sufficient.

Often if a document or piece of equipment were sent back it would obviate the necessity of Intelligence asking for a raid to obtain prisoners and identifications, and, as you gentlemen know, raids are the most expensive way of obtaining this information, as almost always we have officers and men killed in carrying them out. But if no other information is received it is absolutely necessary for Intelligence to ask for raids.

In big offensive operations in trench warfare, when large numbers of prisoners are captured, it is necessary to establish an advanced division collecting station. These collecting stations are located just outside the shelled area. It is required that every effort must be concentrated to getting the prisoners back rapidly to these collecting stations. They will be examined briefly by divisional Intelligence officers and then sent back to the collecting centers, known as the corps or army cages. Separate rooms or tents must be provided for each officer detailed to examine prisoners, and also for each officer likewise detailed for examining documents. In cases such as this it is required that the corps

Intelligence officer send back daily to army headquarters a report, giving the total number of prisoners of each unit, with time and place of capture, who have arrived at the advanced collecting stations, same to be forwarded by wire as soon as received at the corps center. Any reliable, corroborated information of importance obtained either from prisoners or documents will be telegraphed to headquarters at once.

It is required that all prisoners of Alsatian or Lorraine origin be handed over to French authorities. Such prisoners are turned over by the corps Intelligence concerned to the Provost Marshal, who is responsible for taking any further action necessary.

Where an attack is contemplated, it is essential that specially selected men should be detailed to go around the enemy's trenches and collect any documents that may have been left there. These men should make a careful search for documents in the quarters of the battalion and company commanders, of the signal and Intelligence officers, observations stations, etc. All articles of clothing, equipment and ammunition having any possible value from an Intelligence viewpoint, as well as all documents, maps and sketches, etc., will be turned over to the regimental Intelligence officer without delay, who, after listing same and noting particularly the location of the trenches from which each came, will forward them in separate packages to the division Intelligence officer. Other documents of importance taken from prisoners or dead will be forwarded in the same manner. A written report, noting the documents forwarded, will accompany each package.

In open warfare similar principles regarding the examination of documents must be followed, but as it is probable that in open warfare great masses of documents will be obtained, and as it is hopeless to expect to be able to examine documents with such care and thoroughness as is exercised under trench warfare conditions, a certain number must be picked out and gone through with as much care as time permits, leaving the rest for future examination. Intelligence is charged with the duty of examining and forwarding trench mortar bombs, grenades, new patents of shells,

airplane bombs, etc. Paragraphs 76 to 78, Intelligence Regulations, explain fully what is to be done with these articles. It may seem queer to some that Intelligence insists upon reports being made as to the daily firing of shells by the enemy into our territory, but it is easily seen how necessary this is when you consider that the location of the majority of the enemy's batteries which fire regularly are known, but that the caliber can only be obtained from the identification of the projectiles fired by them. The fields of fire of these batteries are also obtained in the same manner. In addition to this, the arrival on the enemy's front of new batteries is often identified by the projectiles they fire into our lines. The enemy very often uses new forms of ammunition etc., and practically the only means we have of finding this out is by collecting such parts of same as fall in our lines and forwarding them to the proper departments for examination.

The corps heavy artillery has an artillery information officer, who is charged with the collection of artillery information. This officer has at his disposal several sources of information that are entirely under the jurisdiction of the corps artillery, such as the flash ranging and sound ranging groups, and observation posts of the field and heavy artillery. He has not at his disposal, except through Intelligence, the information obtained from prisoners, rapatries, documents, infantry observers, interrogation of airplane observers, and interpretation of airplane photographs, etc. As it is vital that the artillery receive information from all possible sources with reference to the enemy's artillery and artillery targets in the enemy's lines and territory, there is an Intelligence officer who is directly under the chief of corps Intelligence, detailed to the office of the artillery information officer. By this means a very close liaison is established between Intelligence and the corps heavy artillery. This Intelligence officer is charged with the transmission to corps Intelligence of all information obtained by the artillery information officer, and to the artillery information officer of all information obtained by corps Intelligence. It is necessary, therefore, that this Intelligence officer should work in the closest touch, not only with

the corps Intelligence and artillery information officer, but also with the Intelligence officer at aviation headquarters, the balloon company attached to the corps, the wireless stations, etc.

There is also attached to each army or corps air service headquarters an Intelligence officer, who receives his instructions direct from and makes his reports to the Intelligence officer of the army or corps to which he is attached. He has as assistants 2 draftsmen, 1 clerk, and 1 orderly. The Intelligence officer with the army or corps air units (known as Branch Intelligence) is charged with collecting and sifting all information obtained by the personnel of the air units by observation and photography, and to insure that such information reaches all whom it may concern in convenient form and without delay. The air units are charged with obtaining information regarding movements and activity in back areas, work on rear lines of defense, photographs of rear lines of defense and oblique photographs of the enemy's front line positions, photographs of the enemy's artillery positions, information of the hostile front line system and the enemy's troops holding it, information regarding movements, the enemy's communications and rear organizations opposite the front and flanks of the corps concerned; information regarding the enemy's artillery which can or does fire on the area of the corps concerned. But the collection and collation of this information is solely a function of Intelligence. It can easily be seen from this that these branch Intelligence officers must be in very close harmony and on very close terms with the aviation units to which they are assigned.

The responsibility for the examination of fallen airplanes rests with the air service, but the examination of documents, maps and photographs, prisoners, or dead bodies found in the airplane, rests with the Intelligence section. The detailed examination of any German aviator captured is made at army headquarters. As it is important that aviator prisoners be examined in technical details, the air service will, if they desire, send an officer to be present at the examination. Therefore they should be notified in advance. The preliminary examination of aviator pri-

soners is held at the corps headquarters in the same manner as that for any other prisoner.

Intelligence is charged with the work of contre-espionage (the detention of spies and the prevention of leakage of military information). In this work Intelligence acts in close touch with the Provost Marshal and his officers. For the purpose of contre-espionage both the chiefs of army Intelligence and corps Intelligence have 2 officers and 12 enlisted men. This personnel is known as the Intelligence Police. Their principal duties are to report all cases of suspected espionage within their area; to keep a careful watch for any possible method of communication with the enemy; to report any breach of regulations by civilians; to interrogate all strangers who appear in the district; to examine all persons found loitering near military places of importance; to examine passes in the possession of civilians and to report any irregularities with regard to them; to collect from refugees and others useful information regarding the country behind the enemy's lines; to find out persons who would be suitable as guides or possible agents and report their names; to control and investigate the movements of civilian workmen employed under the engineers, quartermaster, or other departments of the army. I might add to this that it as been found necessary also to investigate some of the personnel of our own army who are not civilians.

With the exception of the corps summary of Intelligence the only other standard form adopted by the First Army Corps to date is that for the daily Intelligence report of division Intelligence to corps Intelligence. Same is as follows :

DAILY INTELLIGENCE REPORT

to , 1918.

6:00 A. M. to 6:00 A. M.

I. — Enemy, order of battle.

Any information relating to the identification of the units facing the sector; information as to the positions of the various sub-units, command posts, changes of reliefs, and daily routine.

II. — Enemy activity.

1. — *Infantry.*

(*a*) Patrols seen or heard by our men; time and place.
(*b*) Hostile raids or surprise attempts. Time and place. Results. Number of wounded or prisoners.
(*c*) Patrol fighting. Time and place. Results.
(*d*) Rifle fire. Hand and rifle grenades. Time and place.
(*e*) Machine gun fire. Point fired on and point from which fired. Time. New emplacements discovered.
(*f*) Trench mortar fire. Number and caliber of bombs. Point fired on and point from which fired. Time.

2. — *Artillery.*

Point fired on. Time. Number of shells (by tens). Presumed caliber. Certain or approximate point from which fired. Remarks—specify if it is registration, preparation, retaliation, or destructive fire.

III. — Aeronautics.

1. — *Airplanes.*

Observed from. Time. Number of planes. Over what area did they fly and where did they go. Supposed mission (observation, spotting, or battle). Remarks—whether shelled or not by our anti-aircraft batteries or machine guns or attacked by our planes, and the result.

2. — *Balloons.*

Observed from. Location of balloon. Probable view. Time of ascension. Time of landing. Remarks.

IV. — Movements.

(*a*) Visibility : none, good, or bad.
(*b*) Movements of men on trails, roads, or trenches. Time and place. Apparent purpose.
(*c*) Road traffic. The road. Time. Number of wagons, trucks or automobiles. Where seen. Where going. Observed from. Remarks.
(*d*) Railroad traffic. Line. Where seen. Where going.

Time. Total number of cars, if possible. Observed from. Remarks (for example : trains which have been heard but not seen).

(*e*) General impression as to whether traffic is normal or not, and if abnormal, where.

V. — Works.

(From right to left with sketches, if necessary, and with time and place.)

(*a*) Earthworks.
(*b*) Wire entanglements.
(*c*) Mines.
(*d*) Camouflage.
(*e*) Laying of cables or repair of telephone wires.
(*f*) Construction of roads.
(*g*) Construction of railroads.
(*h*) Any other work or sounds of work.

VI. — Miscellaneous.

(*a*) Observation posts or command posts discovered. Give coordinates.
(*b*) Signals, flares, etc., time, place, and kind.
(*c*) Smoke, Time. Place.
(*d*) Sounds. Time.. Place.

VII. — General impressions of the day.

If abnormal in any way, state why.

This form will also be used by regimental Intelligence officers reporting to division Intelligence.

March 11, 1918.

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